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Promises are one of the oldest human-specific
psychological mechanisms fostering cooperation
and trust. Here, we study the neural underpinnings
of promise keeping and promise breaking. Subjects
first make a promise decision (promise stage), then
they anticipate whether the promise affects the
interaction partner’s decision (anticipation stage)
and are subsequently free to keep or break the
promise (decision stage). Findings revealed that the
breaking of the promise is associated with increased
activation in the DLPFC, ACC, and amygdala, sug-
gesting that the dishonest act involves an emotional
conflict due to the suppression of the honest
response. Moreover, the breach of the promise can
be predicted by a perfidious brain activity pattern
(anterior insula, ACC, inferior frontal gyrus) during
the promise and anticipation stage, indicating that
brain measurements may reveal malevolent inten-
tions before dishonest or deceitful acts are actually
committed.
INTRODUCTION
The human capacity to establish and enforce social norms is one
of the decisive reasons for the uniqueness of human cooperation
in the animal kingdom (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Such norms
constitute standards of behavior that are based on widely shared
beliefs on how individuals ought to behave in a given situation
(Ellickson, 2001; Elster, 1989; Horne, 2001; Voss, 2001). In
modern human societies, a large cooperative infrastructure in
the form of laws, impartial courts, and the police exist, which
ensure that cooperative agreements, for example in the form of
enforceable contracts, are kept (Fehr et al., 2002). However, it
is obvious that in more than 90 percent of human history no
such cooperative infrastructure existed. Thus, in ancient times,
other more basic forms of cooperative agreements must have
evolved in order to foster trust, cooperation, and partnership
formation. One basic form of such cooperative agreements are
promises, which might in fact constitute the precursor of
enforceable contracts in contemporary times. Promises
constitute oral and ‘‘nonbinding’’ cooperative agreements,756 Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.which have the goal to strengthen the belief in the exchange
partner that one can be relied upon (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006). Despite their nonbinding nature, many everyday social
and economic exchange situations are still based on such oral
promises. However, although important work examining the
neural basis of social cooperation (Baumgartner et al., 2008a;
Behrens et al., 2008; Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al.,
2005; Rilling et al., 2002, 2007; Singer et al., 2006; Tabibnia
et al., 2008), social comparison, and competition (Decety et al.,
2004; Delgado et al., 2008; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Zink et al.,
2008), as well as social punishment and norm violations
(Buckholtz et al., 2008; de Quervain et al., 2004; Eisenberger
et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Meyer-Lindenberg et al.,
2006; Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007) exists, the brain
systems involved in nonbinding cooperative agreements still
remain unknown. Studying the neural underpinnings of these
nonbinding cooperative agreements is particularly interesting
because promises not only can be kept, but also broken. In
fact, material incentives to cheat are ubiquitous in human
societies, and promises thus can also be misused in any kind
of social or economic exchange situation between two or more
individuals to cheat the exchange partner. Business people,
politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and students in the experimental
laboratory who make use of private information do not always do
so honestly (Gneezy, 2005).
In real life, one reason for keeping promises is to facilitate the
future cooperation of potential exchange partners. However, we
also believe that humans often keep promises because this is
‘‘the right thing to do.’’ Promises in this case are kept even in
one-shot interaction, i.e., although the keeping of the promise
implies a net cost to the promise keeper. In fact, decisive
evidence from behavioral experiments reveals a preference for
promise keeping in one-shot situations (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). Thus, it is possible to
distinguish two major motivations behind promise keeping: first,
instrumental promise keeping for the purpose of facilitating
future cooperation, and second, intrinsic promise keeping for
the purpose of ‘‘doing the right thing.’’ In this paper, we focused
on the second motivational source of promise keeping.
For that purpose, we applied a modified version of an
economic trust game paradigm (Figure 1) where subjects were
completely free to decide whether to keep or to break a promise
and where keeping or breaking a promise caused real monetary
consequences (either benefits or costs) for both exchange
partners. In this economic trust game paradigm, two subjects
Neuron
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Promise Stage
Depicted are the different stages of the economic
trust game with antecedent promise stage. In the
trust game used in the present study, two players
A and B interact anonymously with each other
during one trial. A receives an endowment of 2
money units (MUs) at the beginning of each trial,
whereas B receives nothing. A has to make the
first decision. He can send his endowment of
two MUs to B (case 1), or he can keep his endow-
ment (case 2). If A trusts B and sends his endow-
ment (case 1), the experimenter increases the
amount sent by a factor of five, so that B receives
10 MUs. At that moment, B has 10 MUs and A has
nothing. B then has the choice of sending back
nothing or half of the 10 MUs. Thus, if B acts trust-
worthily and sends back half, both players earn
5 MUs, but if B keeps all the money, he earns
10 MUs and A, who trusted B, earns nothing. In
case 2, that is, if A does not trust B, A keeps his
or her endowment of 2 MUs and B gets nothing.
In total, 24 such trust game trials are played with
different, randomly selected interaction partners.
In half of the played rounds, B has to make a
promise for three subsequent trials whether he
always, mostly, sometimes, or never plans to
send back half of the money. A is always informed
about B’s promise, and B can keep the promise,
but he is also allowed to break it. Color coding:
blue color, promise stage of player B; orange
color, decision stages of either player A or B.
Note that player A’s decision stage is at the
same time as player B’s anticipation stage, during
which player B is informed that player A is now
deciding (see Figure 2); yellow color, outcome
stage player A and B.interacting anonymously are in the role of an investor (player A)
and a trustee (player B). For the purpose of the study, we focused
on the role of the trustee whose brain activity was measured in
the brain scanner. The trustee first has to make a promise deci-
sion at the beginning of a series of three subsequent trust game
trials, indicating whether he always, mostly, sometimes, or never
plans to be trustworthy. In this context, being trustworthy means
sharing the available money so that both players earn the same
amount. Player A, the investor, is always informed about B’s
promise, and can then decide (based on B’s promise) whether
to trust him and invest money or whether not to trust him and
thus to keep the initial endowment. In case player A trusts player
B, which is almost only the case if player B chooses a high
promise level (see Results), the experimenter increases the
amount player A sends by the factor of five. Player B can then
decide to keep the promise and thus honor an investor’s trust
by sending back half of the money, but he may also break the
promise and thus violate the investor’s trust by not sharing.
The experiment consisted of four promise decisions with three
subsequent trust game trials, meaning that subjects played
a total of 12 trust game trials in the promise condition (i.e., with a
promise stage). As a control condition, we also implemented
12 trust game trials without the opportunity of making a promise
decision. The trustee thus faced a total of 24 trust game trials
with 24 different, anonymous, and randomly selected interactionpartners, half of the trials played with a promise stage and half of
them without the opportunity to make a promise. Please note
that the social interactions between trustees and interaction
partners were genuine, that is, the trustees in the scanner faced
the decisions of 24 real human interaction partners and their
choices actually affected the interaction partners’ monetary
payoffs (please see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
details).
This design enables us to study three different processes
that play an important role during nonbinding cooperative
agreements: (1) the process of promising, (2) the process of
anticipating the effect of the promise on the exchange partner’s
decision to trust, and (3) the decision-making process during
which the decision to keep or to break the promise has to be
implemented (see Figure 2 for two timelines of trust game trials
with and without opportunity to make a promise). We are
particularly interested in whether the brain activity pattern differs
at the different stages of the paradigm dependent on the
decision to keep or to break the promise.
In the experiment, the trustees were completely free to choose
the strength of their promise (i.e., whether they promise always,
mostly, sometimes, or never to share the money in the subse-
quent three trials) and to honor or break their promise. This led
to two large behavioral clusters of individuals and only very few
subjects did not belong to one of the two clusters. First, aNeuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 757
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The Neural Circuitry of a Broken PromiseFigure 2. Timeline for Two Trials of the Trust Game with and without Antecedent Promise Stage
The trust game trials start with a fixation epoch that lasts for 10–12 s (randomly jittered). After this fixation epoch, the promise stage begins in 8 of 24 trust trials,
during which the subject has to implement his promise level for three subsequent trust game trials (within a time restriction of 9 s, mean:3 s) or during which he
receives the information that he cannot decide about a promise level. After the promise stage, there is another fixation epoch lasting for 10–12 s (randomly
jittered). Then the anticipation stage begins, which last for 6 s, during which the subject is informed that his assigned player A is now deciding. This anticipation
stage is followed by the decision stage, which is divided into three parts. First, the subject is informed for 6 s whether player A trusted him or not (not depicted).
The subject is then reminded on the same decision screen of his promise or that he could not make a promise for the current trial. This information is presented for
3 s. Finally, after 9 s in total, the decision options are presented on the same screen, allowing the subject to implement his decision within a time restriction of 7 s.
The first 6 s of the decision stage are referred to in the paper as decision phase A, whereas the second 3 s until button press are referred to as decision phase B
(average response time from the beginning of decision phase A until button press:10 s). Finally, a trust game trial is completed by the profit stage (not depicted),
which presents the outcome of both players for the current trust game trial for 6 s and provides the information that a new player A is assigned to the subject.substantial proportion of the subjects promised to share the
money ‘‘always’’ but actually did not share it in the subsequent
trust games (dishonest subjects). Second, another large propor-
tion of the subjects also promised to share the money ‘‘always’’
but these subjects subsequently kept their promise (honest
subjects). These two clusters of individuals also behaved very
consistently when they could not make a promise, with the
dishonest subjects almost never sharing the money, while the
honest subjects almost always shared the money (for detailed
statistical information, please see the behavioral analyses in
Results).
This behavioral data pattern requires that special care be taken
in the analysis of the neuroimaging data in order to control for
payoff differences and differences in fairness related behaviors.
In particular, it is not possible to make simple, direct comparisons
between the dishonest and the honest subjects’ brain activity
within the ‘‘promise possible’’ condition or within the ‘‘no promise
possible’’ condition because such comparisons will be758 Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.confounded with fairness differences and differences in material
payoffs across the subjects. For this reason, we computed the
following serial subtraction term for each of the stages of our
paradigm: [Promise (P) – No Promise (NoP)]Dishonest subjects –
[Promise (P) – No Promise (NoP)]Honest subjects, where (P) indicates
the ‘‘promise possible condition’’ and (NoP) the ‘‘no promise
possible’’ condition. Note that this contrast controls for fairness
and payoff differences because dishonest subjects make the
same unfair choices and earn the same payoff across the
‘‘promise possible’’ and the ‘‘no promise possible’’ condition.
Thus, the brain activity in the contrast (P – NoP)Dishonest subjects
does not contain fairness and payoff-related brain activation.
Likewise, honest subjects make the same fair choices and earn
the same payoff across the ‘‘promise possible’’ and the ‘‘no
promise possible’’ condition and, hence, the activity in the
contrast (P – NoP)Honest subjects does not contain fairness and
payoff-related brain activation. In addition, the serial subtraction
term above controls for any unspecific effects of personality
Neuron
The Neural Circuitry of a Broken Promisebecause the subjects in the ‘‘promise possible’’ condition have
the same personality and display the same behavior as the
subjects in the ‘‘no promise possible’’ condition. The above
contrast thus rules out the impact of any personality differences
on brain activation that have nothing to do with promise making
and promise breaking.
Using the described serial subtraction terms, our study
provides the opportunity to answer the following three research
questions:
First, is it possible to differentiate between subjects who will
break a promise and those subjects who will keep a promise
based on the brain activity pattern during the promise stage of
the paradigm, i.e., during a stage of the paradigm when the
dishonest act might already be planned or prepared, but does
not yet have to be implemented? In other words, can we predict
whether subjects will keep or break the promise based on a
perfidious brain activity pattern measured during the promise
stage? We hypothesize that if subjects indeed already plan to
break the promise at this stage of the paradigm, the misleading
promise decision should evoke an emotional conflict. Such an
emotional conflict might be indicated in the brain by increased
activity in brain regions known to be involved in conflict
(Baumgartner et al., 2008a; Botvinick et al., 1999) and in negative
emotion processing (Amaral, 2003; Phillips et al., 2003; Sanfey
et al., 2003), including anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insular
cortex, or amygdala.
Second, there is another stage in the paradigm which takes
place before subjects have to implement whether to keep or
break their promise. Subjects receive the information during
this stage that their investor is now deciding whether to trust or
not. While the chosen promise level can positively affect the
investor’s trust decision in trust game trials with promise stage,
this is not the case in trust game trials without promise stage.
The investor’s actual behavior is thus much more difficult to
forecast in trust game trials without promise stage, and the nega-
tive outcome for the subjects (i.e., mistrust on the part of the
investor) is more likely, making the anticipation process more
uncertain and stressful. We therefore wondered whether this
uncertain and stressful anticipation process might be more
pronounced in subjects who intend to break rather than keep
the promise. In other words, can we even differentiate between
dishonest and honest subjects in a stage of our paradigm
when no decision at all must be made? Recent brain imaging
studies have consistently shown that the anticipation of such
stressful and in particular uncertain events, that is events which
can either be positive or negative, is primarily associated with
increased activity in two brain regions, the bilateral anterior
insula and right inferior frontal gyrus (Herwig et al., 2007a,
2007b). If it is indeed the case that this uncertain and stressful
anticipation process were more pronounced in subjects who
plan to break the promise, we would expect brain activation in
the regions mentioned above.
Third, what are the differences in brain activity between
breaking and keeping a promise when subjects must ultimately
implement their decision? Previous studies on deception
(for recent reviews see Sip et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2004) did
not distinguish between the promise, anticipation, and the
decision stage and focused instead on the act of implementinga lie. We argue that such a deceptive act involves a similar
cognitive and emotional process as during the implementation
of a broken promise. While deceptive subjects have to suppress
the truthful response, dishonest subjects have to suppress the
honest response. Either suppression most likely leads to an
emotional conflict, which might include a guilty conscience or
the fear of negative consequences in case the deceptive or
dishonest act is detected. Deception paradigms have con-
sistently associated this kind of conflictuous cognitive and
emotional processes with increased activity of discrete anterior
frontal regions and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In
addition, more recent studies, which increased the subjects’
emotional involvement by using more ecologically valid
paradigms (e.g., mock-crime scenarios, guilty knowledge tests;
Abe et al., 2007; Kozel et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005) rather
consistently showed increased activity in emotion-related areas,
such as the amygdala, insula, and orbitofrontal cortex. Due to the
similar cognitive and emotional processes assumed to take
place in the promise breaker’s brain, we expect a similar activity
pattern in the decision stage of our paradigm in the contrast
between subjects who break and those who keep a promise.
However, it is important to note that our paradigm has two major
advantages compared to previous deception paradigms
(see Sip et al., 2008 for an extensive discussion of the limitations
of previous deception paradigms), allowing us to study the
mentioned processes in a more ecologically valid situation. First,
while subjects in our paradigm were completely free to decide
whether to break or keep the promise, subjects in all previous
deception paradigms were forced to lie or to tell the truth.
Second, while the dishonest act in our paradigm was embedded
in a social exchange involving positive and negative con-
sequences or costs for the exchange partners, the deceptive
act in all previous deception studies did not have such
consequences because the subjects were, without exception,
interacting with the experimenter(s) (for the most ‘‘realistic’’
version, see Abe et al., 2007). Thus, in previous studies it was
rather obvious to a subject that a lie could not cause any real
harm or costs to the experimenter. However, lying without
malevolent intent and without evoked consequences for the
deceived individual lacks important elements of guilt, personal
gain, and the psychological stress that often accompany the
generation and enactment of a lie in the ‘‘real world’’ (Gneezy,
2005). For these reasons, our study is the first to explore the
neural underpinnings of the emotional and cognitive processes
discussed above using an ecologically valid paradigm where
subjects could decide freely to break or keep the promise during
a realistic social exchange involving positive or negative
consequences for the exchange partners.
Summing up, our paradigm enables us to answer the
following questions: Do subjects who ultimately breach or
keep a promise already have a differential brain activation
pattern in stages of the paradigm during which the decision
to break or keep the promise does not yet have to be imple-
mented, but might already be prepared or planned? In other
words, can we predict the dishonest act based on perfidious
brain activity in the promise or anticipation stage of the
paradigm? Moreover, do we find a similar differential brain
activation pattern during the decision stage of our paradigmNeuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 759
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discussed deception studies where subjects were forced
to lie or to tell the truth and where lying had no negative
consequences for the deceived individual?
RESULTS
Behavioral and Psychometrical Results
Group Classification
Due to the fact that the trustees in our experiment were
completely free to break or keep the promise, we examined in
a first analysis whether our subjects can be classified into
different subgroups based on their individual average return
rate (see Experimental Procedures for details) in trust games
played either with or without antecedent promise stage. For
that purpose, we conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis
(Ward’s method, squared Euclidean distance measures, see
Experimental Procedures for details) using both return rates
(with and without antecedent promise stage) as dependent
variables. Results indicated a cluster solution with two strongly
separated clusters (see dendrogram of Figure S1). Inspection
of the two clusters revealed two groups of subjects, i.e., those
who either behaved trustworthily (referred to in the paper as
honest group/subjects) or those who acted untrustworthily
(referred to in the paper as dishonest group/subjects), irrespec-
tive of whether the trust games were played with or without
antecedent promise stage (see Figure 3A). A two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA with between-subject factor group
Figure 3. Behavioral Results
(A) Depicted are means ± SE of player B’s return
rates (in percentage), broken down for groups
(dishonest/honest) and promise stages (trust
games with/without antecedent promise stage).
Findings indicate strong group differences in re-
turn rates irrespective of whether trust games are
played with or without antecedent promise stage.
(B) High positive correlation (r = 0.89, p = 0.000)
between return rates of trust games played with
and without antecedent promise stage.
(C) Depicted are means ± SE of player B’s promise
levels (in percentage), broken down for groups
(dishonest/honest) and the two highest promise
levels (always send back/mostly send back). Find-
ings indicate that both groups of subjects predom-
inantly chose very high promise levels despite very
different return rate patterns.
(D) Depicted are means ± SE of player A’s trust
rates (in percentage), broken down for groups
(dishonest/honest) and promise stage (trust games
with/without antecedent promise stage). Findings
indicate no group differences in trust rates, but
an increased trust rate, as expected, during trust
game trials with antecedent promise stage.
(honest/dishonest) and within-subject
factor promise stage (trust games with/
without antecedent promise stage) re-
vealed a highly significant main effect of
group (F(1,24) = 102.80, p = 0.000,
ETA2 = 0.93), but no interaction effect of group 3 promise stage
(F(1,24) = 0.46, p = 0.501, ETA
2 = 0.01), thus confirming that these
two groups of subjects strongly differed in their return rate
patterns, irrespective of whether the trust games were played
with or without antecedent promise stage—a necessary
precondition for the unconfounded analysis of the brain data
as extensively discussed in the introduction section. The addi-
tionally discovered main effect of promise stage (F(1,24) = 8.86,
p = 0.007, ETA2 = 0.27) demonstrated that both groups of
subjects showed some slight tendencies for increased return
rates in trust game trials with antecedent promise stage
(Figure 3A). Finally, the very high positive correlation between
the two return rates (r = .89, p = 0.000, ETA2 = 0.79)
demonstrated not only that the two groups showed a consistent
behavioral pattern but, importantly, that each individual subject
alone did so as well (Figure 3B).
Promise Level
In a next analysis, we examined whether the two groups of
subjects differed in their chosen promise level. The two lowest
promise levels (sometimes or never send back half of the MUs)
were only chosen three times in total (by three different subjects).
Thus, subjects of each group chose one of the two highest
promise levels during almost every promise decision, i.e., either
always or mostly send back half of the MUs. Figure 3C illustrates
the average of the two chosen highest promise levels
(in percentage), broken down for the dishonest and honest
group, respectively. A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA
with between-subject factor group (dishonest/honest) and760 Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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MUs) revealed neither main effects (main effect of group:
F(1,24) = 0.209, p = 0.652, ETA
2 = 0.01; main effect of promise
level (F(1,24) = 3.264, p = 0.08, ETA
2 = 0.12), nor an interaction
effect (group 3 promise level: F(1,24) = 1.210, p = 0.282, ETA
2 =
0.05), demonstrating that the two groups of subjects do not differ
with respect to the chosen promise levels. Thus, the selection of
different promise levels cannot explain the highly differential
return rate pattern between the two groups during trust game
trials with antecedent promise stage.
Trust Rate Player A
We next examined whether the differential return rates of player B
are due to different trust rates of player A. We again calculated
a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with between-subject
factor group (dishonest/honest) and within-subject factorpromise
stage (trust games with and without antecedent promise stage).
Results revealed neither a main effect of group (F(1,24) = 0.957,
p =0.338, ETA2 = 0.04)nor an interaction effectofgroup3promise
stage (F(1,24) = 0.131, p = 0.721, ETA
2 = 0.005), suggesting that two
groups experienced very similar trust rates of player A (Figure 3D).
On the other hand, the main effect of promise stage was significant
(F(1,24) = 29.408, p = 0.000, ETA
2 = 0.55), demonstrating, as ex-
pected, an increased trusting behavior of player A in trust game
trials with promise stage (Figure 3D).
Response Times
Next, we examined Player B’s response times during both the
promise and decision stages (excluding those trials during which
Player B could not make a decision because player A did not
trust him) using a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with
between-subject factor group (dishonest/honest) and within-
subject factor promise stage (trust games with and without
antecedent promise stage). We found no effect of group on
response times (main effects of group and interaction effects
of group 3 promise stage: all p > 0.360). The main effect of the
factor promise stage during the decision trial was also not
significant (p > 0.254), but, as expected, this main effect was
significant during the promise stage (F(1,24) = 17.369, p = 0.000,
ETA2 = 0.42), indicating an increase in response times during
promise stages in which subjects actually had to decide about
their promise level (mean ± SE: 3.14 s ± 0.19) compared to the
other condition during which they just had to press a button
without reflecting about the promise level (mean ± SE: 2.33 s ±
0.18; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details).
Personality Characteristics andDegree of Psychological
Symptoms
Finally, we checked whether our two groups of subjects differ in
main personality characteristics (e.g., neuroticism, extraversion,
Machiavellism) and degree of psychological symptoms (e.g.,
depression, anxiety, aggression/hostility). For that purpose,
we administered the ‘‘Brief Symptom Inventory’’ (BSI) question-
naire, the ‘‘NEO-Five-Factor-Inventory’’ (NEO-FFI) questionnaire
(Costa and McCrae, 1992) and the Machiavelli questionnaire
(Christie and Geis, 1970). Importantly, all scales showed no
group differences (BSI: all p > 0.33, NEO-FFI: all p > 0.30,
Machiavelli questionnaire: all p > 0.21). Furthermore, correlations
of return rates with these personality and psychological symptom
scales did not reveal any significant result (BSI: all p > 0.38, NEO-
FFI: all p > 0.22, Machiavelli questionnaire: all p > 0.29; please seeTables S5–S7 for detailed statistical information to each scale).
These findings suggest that the reported differential brain activity
patterns (see below) are not driven by specific (related to the act
of promising) personality differences between promise breakers
and promise keepers, but that they rather reflect the (intended or
actual act of) breaking a promise relative to the (intended or
actual act of) keeping a promise, regardless of the subjects’
personality characteristics. However, please note that the ques-
tionnaire evidence cannot completely rule out that an unknown
personality or demographic factor not directly assessed by the
questionnaires could contribute to the difference in the subjects’
tendencies toward promise keeping or breaking.
Brain Imaging Results
Promise Stage
In a first brain imaging analysis, we were interested whether it is
possible to differentiate between honest and dishonest subjects
based on their brain activation pattern in the promise stage. This
stage is of particular interest because, as we show in the behav-
ioral results section, the two groups of subjects do not differ in
their behavior, i.e., they chose the same promise level and
even need the same amount of time to implement their decision.
Furthermore, the promise stage takes place at a time point when
the decision to be dishonest or honest does not yet have to be
implemented, thus still providing the opportunity to reconsider
and change the decision. It is therefore an open question
whether subjects already show a perfidious brain activation
pattern indicating the planned breach of promise at this
time point. Comparing dishonest subjects with honest
subjects (using the serial subtraction term: [Promise – No
Promise]Dishonest subjects – [Promise – No Promise]Honest subjects)
indeed revealed a highly differential brain activation pattern,
i.e., dishonest subjects compared to honest subjects showed
increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and
bilateral in the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula region
(referred to as frontoinsular cortex in the following; Figures 4A
and 4B, Table S1). In contrast, calculating the reversed
serial subtraction term ([Promise – No Promise]Honest subjects –
[Promise – No Promise]Dishonest subjects) showed no increased
activation in honest compared to dishonest subjects, even at a
strongly lowered p < 0.05 (uncorrected).
In order to clarify whether the revealed brain activation pattern
is not only group, but also stage-specific, we created functional
regions of interests (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures
for details) in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular cortex and
extracted, based on these ROIs, b estimates in all stages of
the paradigm, including the anticipation and decision stages
(decision phase A + B). We calculated independent t tests based
on these b estimates in order to check for group differences in
these brain regions. We found no other stage of the paradigm
in which these regions showed a differential group effect (ACC:
all p > 0.29; right frontoinsular cortex: all p > 0.26; left
frontoinsular cortex: all p > 0.42), indicating that this neural
correlate is both group-dependent and stage-dependent; that
is, only subjects of the dishonest group who later intend to break
their promises in the decision stage react with increased
activation in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular cortex during
the promise stage.Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 761
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(A) Depicted on sagittal and coronal slices is the increased activation in dishonest compared to honest subjects (based on the serial subtraction term: [Promise –
No Promise]Dishonest subjects – [Promise – No Promise]Honest subjects) in the ACC (BA 24, x = 6, y = 33, z = 6) and bilateral frontoinsular cortex (BA 47/13, x = 30,
y = 24, z =18; x = 42, y = 15, z =24) at p < 0.005 (voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes depicted at p < 0.01). Despite the fact that both groups
of subjects implement the same promise decision, the dishonest subjects who will deceive at the following decision stages already show a perfidious brain acti-
vation pattern during the promise stage. Bar plots representing contrast estimates ± SE (Promise > No Promise) of functional ROIs (see Experimental Procedures
for details) demonstrate that the differential group effect in all regions is mainly based on increased activation in the dishonest group in the Promise compared to
the No Promise condition at p% 0.005 (***) or p% 0.001 (****).
(B) Return rates show a strong negative correlation with ACC (r = –0.68, p < 0.001) and bilateral frontoinsular cortex (right frontoinsular cortex: r = –0.72, p < 0.001;
left frontoinsular cortex [not depicted]: r = –0.66, p < 0.001) using the same functional ROIs as in (A).Anticipation Stage
In a next analysis, we were interested whether dishonest and
honest subjects also show differential brain activations in the
anticipation stage of the paradigm, that is in a stage of the
paradigm during which no decision related the dishonest or
honest act has to be made. We focused in our analysis in
particular on the anticipation process during trust game trials
without antecedent promise stage. In these trials, in contrast to
trials with antecedent promise stage, choosing a high promise
level cannot influence the investor’s actual behavior, making
the anticipation process more uncertain and stressful. We indeed
found that the two groups differ in this uncertain and
stressful anticipation process. Comparing dishonest with honest
subjects (using the serial subtraction term: [No Promise -
Promise]Dishonest subjects minus [No Promise– Promise]Honest subjects)
revealed increased brain activation in the right anterior insula and
right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in dishonest subjects (Figures 5A
and 5B, Table S2). In contrast, calculating the reversed serial
subtraction term showed no increased activation in honest
compared to dishonest subjects, even at a strongly lowered
p < 0.05 (uncorrected), suggesting that this anticipation process
is more pronounced in subjects who behave dishonestly.762 Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.In a next step, we again examined how stage-specific this
activation pattern actually is. For that purpose, we extracted
b estimates based on functional ROIs (IFG and anterior insula)
for all stages of the paradigm. Independent t tests revealed no
differential group effect in these brain regions during any other
stage of the paradigm (IFG: all p > 0.19; anterior insula: all
p > 0.44), again indicating that the activation in these brain
regions is not only group, but also stage dependent.
Decision Stage
We used two different regression models to examine the brain
activation pattern during the decision stage. In a first model of
the decision stage, we were interested in brain regions showing
a sustained activation over both decision phases A + B (decision
phase A, revealment of player A’s trust decision; decision phase
B, player B is reminded of his promise, see Figure 2 for a detailed
explanation of these two phases). For that purpose, we created
a decision regressor which modeled the decision epoch as a
whole, i.e., from onset decision screen in decision phase A until
implementation of the decision via button press in decision
phase B (mean duration 10.13 s). In a second model of the
decision stage, we modeled decision phases A and B separately,
in order to examine whether the two phases can be differentiated
Neuron
The Neural Circuitry of a Broken PromiseFigure 5. Differential Brain Activation Pattern during the Anticipation Stage
(A) Depicted on sagittal slices is the increased activation in dishonest compared to honest subjects (based on the serial subtraction term: [No Promise –
Promise]Dishonest subjects – [No Promise – Promise]Honest subjects) in the right IFG (BA 45, x = 57, y = 12, z = 6) and right anterior insula (BA 13, x = 45, y = 0,
z = 6) at p < 0.005 (voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes depicted at p < 0.01). Despite the fact that both groups are confronted with the
same uncertainty during the anticipation of player’s A trusting behavior (whether or not he trusts), the brain activation pattern of the dishonest subjects suggests
a more pronounced anticipation process. Bar plots representing contrast estimates ± SE (No Promise > Promise) of functional ROIs (see Experimental
Procedures for details) demonstrate that the differential group effect in all regions is mainly based on increased activation in the dishonest subjects in the
No Promise compared to the Promise condition at p% 0.01 (**).
(B) Return rates show a strong negative correlation with right IFG (r = –0.61, p < 0.001) and right anterior insula (r = –0.64, p < 0.001) using the same functional
ROIs as in (A).by a unique brain activation pattern (for details of the two
different models please see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures).
Examining the decision stage as whole (using the decision
regressor of the first model) by comparing the dishonest subjects
with the honest subjects (using the serial subtraction
term: [Promise – No Promise]Dishonest subjects – [Promise – No
Promise]Honest subjects) revealed only one brain region that
showed a differential activity: the dishonest subjects showed
sustained activation in the ventral part of the striatum
during the whole decision stage (Figure 6, Table S3). In contrast,
a separate examination of the two decision phases (based on the
decision regressors of the second model) using the same serial
subtraction term revealed increased activation in dishonest
subjects in the ACC and left DLPFC (at the border between
DLPFC and VLPFC) during decision phase A (Figures 7A and
7B, Table S3), while the same group of subjects showed
increased activation in the left amygdala during decision phase
B (Figure 7C, Table S3). We observed no increased brain
activation using the reversed serial subtraction terms in honest
compared to dishonest subjects, even at a strongly lowered
p < 0.05 (uncorrected).
In order to corroborate the described specificity in the decision
stage, we created functional ROIs and extracted b estimates
separately for all three decision regressors (decision phase A +B, decision phase A, and decision phase B). Independent t tests
confirmed the suggested specificity with respect to the time point
of differential group activity during the decision stage for all ROIs
(ventral striatum, DLPFC, ACC, and amygdala; please see
Table S4 for details). Independent t tests of b estimates based
on the same functional ROIs of the decision stage also showed
no differential group effect during any other stage (promise and
anticipation) of the paradigm (ACC: all p > 0.08; DLPFC: all p >
0.32; amygdala: all p > 0.45; ventral striatum: all p > 0.93).
Finally, we conducted additional analyses presented in the
supplementary material in order to further control for potential
confounding factors (Supplemental Analysis S1), to further
corroborate the stage-specificity of the activity patterns (Supple-
mental Analysis S2), and to examine the activity in the decision
stage with slightly different decision regressors (Supplemental
Analysis S3). These three additional analyses confirmed the find-
ings reported above.
DISCUSSION
In order to study the neural underpinnings of nonbinding
cooperative agreements in the form of promises, we used a
social-interaction paradigm derived from game theory in which
subjects were completely free to decide whether to break or to
keep the promise and in which breaking or keeping a promiseNeuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 763
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exchange partners. We found that all stages of the paradigm
revealed a highly specific brain activation pattern, enabling us
to differentiate between subjects who break a promise and those
who keep a promise (see Figures 4–7). Importantly, the applied
serial subtraction term analysis (see Introduction and Results
section) rules out the impact of any personality differences on
brain activation that have nothing to do with promise making
and promise breaking. Furthermore, the obtained questionnaire
evidence favors the view that the reported differential brain
activity patterns are also not driven by specific (related to the
act of promising) personality differences between promise
breakers and promise keepers, but rather that they reflect
the (intended or actual) act of breaking a promise relative to
the (intended or actual) act of keeping a promise, regardless
of the subjects’ personality characteristics. However, please
note that the questionnaire evidence does not completely rule
out that other unknown personality factors, which are not directly
assessed by the questionnaires, contribute to the difference in
the subjects’ tendencies toward promise keeping or breaking.
Two stages of the paradigm allow us to look for differences in
brain activity between honest and dishonest subjects during
time points when the subjects do not yet have to implement
the decision to break or to keep the promise. The stage of
particular interest in this regard is the promise stage of the
paradigm because behavioral findings in our study showed
Figure 6. Differential Brain Activation
Pattern during the Decision Stage with
Combined Modeled Decision Phases A
and B
Depicted on a coronal slice is the increased activa-
tion in dishonest compared to honest subjects
(based on the serial subtraction term: [Promise –
No Promise]Dishonest subjects – [Promise – No
Promise]Honest subjects) in the right ventral striatum
(x = 24, y = 12, z = 0) at p < 0.005 (voxel extent
threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes de-
picted at p < 0.01). This finding suggests that
dishonest subjects have increased activity in the
ventral striatum during the whole decision
process. Bar plots representing contrast
estimates ± SE (Promise > No Promise) of func-
tional ROIs (see Experimental Procedures for
details) demonstrate that the differential group
effect is mainly based on increased activation in
dishonest subjects in the Promise compared to
the No Promise condition at p % 0.005 (***). The
scatter plot demonstrates that the return rates
are negatively correlated with activity in the right
ventral striatum (r = –0.49, p < 0.01) using the
same functional ROI.
that dishonest and honest subjects do
not differ with regard to their chosen
promise level, and even the response
times for implementing the promise deci-
sion are equal. Nevertheless, the brain
activation pattern is highly differential,
that is subjects who will break their
promise at later stages of the paradigm already show increased
activation in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular cortex. The ACC
has been demonstrated to be consistently implicated in conflict
monitoring and cognitive control both during social (Baumgart-
ner et al., 2008a; Delgado et al., 2005) and nonsocial paradigms
(Botvinick et al., 1999, 2001; Carter et al., 1998). The insula
(including frontoinsular cortex) has been shown to be involved
in the mapping of body-related sensations, including tempera-
ture, pain, proprioception, and viscera (for review see Craig,
2002). Consistent with this mapping hypothesis, insula activa-
tions were mainly found during aversive emotional experiences
associated with strong visceral and somatic sensations such
as the experience of unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia
et al., 2008; Tabibnia et al., 2008), the threat of punishment (Spit-
zer et al., 2007), and the anticipation of negative and unknown
emotional events (Herwig et al., 2007a, 2007b). Taken together,
the increased activation in the ACC and bilateral frontoinsular
cortex suggests that subjects who behave dishonestly already
form their intent to break the promise during the promise stage.
We assume that this intention leads to a decision conflict and
associated (aversive) emotional experiences, represented in the
brain in the ACC and frontoinsular cortex. The aversive emotional
experience might include the guilty conscience toward the
exchange partner whom the promise will intentionally mislead.
Interestingly, both of these brain regions are thought to belong
to a reflexive, automatic system of social cognition proposed764 Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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Depicted on sagittal and coronal slices is the increased activation in dishonest compared to honest subjects (based on the serial subtraction term: [Promise –
NoPromise]Dishonest subjects – [Promise – No Promise]Honest subjects) during decision phase A or B at p < 0.005 (voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, for display purposes
depicted at p < 0.01). In decision phase A, increased activation was found in the (A) ACC (BA 24, x = 6, y = 27, z = 18) and (B) left DLPFC (BA 10/46, x = 39,
y = 54, z = 15), whereas in decision phase B increased activity was found in the (C) left amygdala (x = 30, y = 0, z = 21). Bar plots representing contrast
estimates ± SE (Promise > No Promise) of functional ROIs (see Experimental Procedures for details) confirm this suggested activity pattern by illustrating the
group-dependent and phase-dependent activity of these brain regions during the two phases of the decision stage. Asterisks indicate significantly increased
activity in dishonest subjects in the Promise compared to the No Promise condition at p % 0.01 (**) or p % 0.005 (***). Finally, the scatter plots demonstrates
that the return rates are negatively correlated with activity in the ACC (r = –0.41, p < 0.05) and left DLPFC (r = –0.40, p < 0.05) during decision phase A as well
as left amygdala (r = –0.40, p < 0.05) during decision phase B.by Lieberman and colleagues (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute and
Lieberman, 2006). We thus speculate that due to the reflexive
mode of operation of these brain regions, it might be rather diffi-
cult or even impossible for dishonest subjects to suppress this
reaction pattern in the brain voluntarily, i.e., not to ‘‘signal’’ their
planned breach of promise with a perfidious brain activation
pattern.
Another stage of the paradigm takes place before the
dishonest act has to be implemented. During this stage, the
subjects do not even have to make a decision, they are merely
informed that their exchange partners are now deciding whether
to trust or not and the subjects can thus do nothing but anticipate
the outcome of the investor’s trust decision. Interestingly, the
two groups (dishonest/honest) do not differ in hypothesizedregions of interests during anticipation trials with antecedent
promise stage (see Table S2 for the two small differences in other
regions). In these trials, choosing a high promise level can
influence the investor’s trusting behavior (and all subjects did
so), thus reducing the probability that the investor will not trust.
In contrast, the investor’s trusting behavior cannot be affected
in trials without antecedent promise stage and the outcome of
the trust decision is therefore much more difficult to forecast,
making the anticipation trial more emotional and stressful.
Recent brain imaging studies (Herwig et al., 2007a, 2007b,
2009) have shown that the anticipation of such negative and
unforeseeable (either negative or positive) emotional events is
mainly associated with increased activation in the bilateral
anterior insula and right IFG. Moreover, these studies showNeuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 765
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which are associated with negative expectations toward future
events, correlate positively with these brain regions during the
anticipation trials, i.e., the higher the score in these personality
measures, the higher the activation in the bilateral anterior insula
and right IFG. We found that similar to subjects with higher
depressive or neuroticism scores, subjects who behaved
dishonestly reacted to the unpredictable and thus emotional
and stressful anticipation stage of our paradigm with increased
activation in the same brain regions (right anterior insula and right
IFG). This suggests that social exchange situations associated
with a lack of control and uncertainty are more pronounced
and more intensely experienced in subjects who intend to
behave dishonestly, which might indicate that they more strongly
anticipate a negative outcome (e.g., mistrust on the part of the
investor) in unpredictable social situations than subjects who
intend to behave honestly. Taken together, our findings
demonstrate that the dishonest subjects can be differentiated
from honest subjects even in stages of the paradigm during
which no decision related to the dishonest act has to be made.
The stage during which the dishonest or honest act actually
has to be implemented revealed an activity pattern in accor-
dance with our assumption that the breaking of a promise and
the telling of a lie involve similar cognitive and emotional
processes and associated brain activation patterns. In detail,
we argued that while deceptive subjects have to suppress the
truthful response, dishonest subjects have to suppress the
honest response. In line with this assumption, our study, along
with most deception paradigms (e.g., Abe et al., 2006; Kozel
et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005; Nun˜ez et al., 2005; Phan et al.,
2005; Spence et al., 2001, 2008), revealed increased activity in
brain regions of the lateral PFC which are known to play an
essential role in the control and suppression of (inappropriate)
cognitions and behaviors (e.g., Aron, 2007; Baumgartner et al.,
2006, 2008b; Beeli et al., 2008; Ja¨ncke et al., 2008; Spitzer
et al., 2007). Furthermore, we argued that the suppression of
both the truthful and the honest response most likely leads to
an emotional conflict in the deceptive and dishonest subjects.
Again corroborating this assumption, our study and most of
previous deception studies (e.g., Abe et al., 2006; Kozel et al.,
2005; Langleben et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005; Nun˜ez et al.,
2005; Phan et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2001) demonstrated
increased activity in the ACC, which constitutes the brain region
most consistently associated with cognitive and emotional
conflict processing and resolving (e.g., Baumgartner et al.,
2008a; Botvinick et al., 1999; Etkin et al., 2006). Taken together,
our paradigm, which substantially improved previous deception
paradigms (subjects in our paradigm were free to decide
and their decisions caused both positive and negative conse-
quences for the exchange partners, see Introduction), confirmed
the activation of the aforementioned brain regions during the
assumed cognitive and emotional processes involved in the
implementation of the deceptive or dishonest acts. Moreover,
our paradigm also substantiated the assumption that truthful
responding comprises a relative baseline in human cognition
and communication (i.e., truthful responding compared to lying
does not require an activity increase in any single brain region,
Spence et al., 2004), because, similar to most deception para-766 Neuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.digms, we did not find any activity increase during the decision
stage of our paradigm in subjects who behaved honestly
compared to those who behaved dishonestly. Furthermore, we
could extend these negative findings to all other stages of our
paradigm (promise and anticipation stages). Thus, in spite of
the fact that our honest subjects freely chose to keep their
promises in a ‘‘realistic’’ social exchange, no specific neural
correlate of honesty was observed in any stage of the paradigm,
even at a strongly lowered significance threshold.
Besides increased activity in the ACC and DLPFC, the
amygdala demonstrated increased activity during the breaking
of a promise in the decision stage of our paradigm. Whereas
activity in the ACC and DLPFC belong to the most replicated
findings in neuroimaging studies on deception, up to now only
three of the deception studies reported increased activation of
the amygdala—a brain region widely acknowledge to play an
important role in emotion (Phan et al., 2002; Phillips et al.,
2003) and in particular fear processing (Adolphs et al., 2005;
Amaral, 2003; Baumgartner et al., 2008a). In two of these
studies, subjects had to detect deceptive intentions; the findings
indicated that the crucial factor for amygdala activation is the
subject’s involvement, that is, amygdala activation was only
observed if the subject was the target of the deceit (Gre`zes
et al., 2004, 2006). Only one study, which focused on the neural
activities of those telling lies, reported activation of the
amygdala. Of all conducted deception studies, this study
(Abe et al., 2007) used a paradigm that might get closest to
real life deception by introducing a clever twist in the paradigm.
This twist consisted of having a second experimenter tell the
subject to disobey the first experimenter, i.e., when the first
experimenter instructed the subject to tell the truth, the second
experimenter secretly asked the subject to deceive. Thus, we
conclude that increasing the subjects’ emotional involvement
by creating a ‘‘realistic’’ social situation seems to trigger the
amygdala response in the study by Abe and colleagues (2007)
and our paradigm—notably in a very similar ventral part of the
left amygdala. Furthermore, the time point of amygdala
activation in our paradigm provides some additional evidence
as to which process might have evoked the amygdala activation
in both studies. This evidence can be derived from the fact that
we only found increased activation of the amygdala during
decision phase B, i.e., when subjects were reminded of their
promise they were going to break. This suggests that it is not
the dishonest or deceptive act per se (including the inhibition
of the honest/truthful response and associated conflict), but
rather the deliberate confrontation with the promise toward the
interaction partner, which might drive the amygdala activation.
Whereas subjects in our paradigm explicitly had to make a
promise toward the interaction partner, the promise was more
implicit in nature in the study of Abe and colleagues (2007),
i.e., subjects implicitly promised the first experimenter to obey
his instructions. Taken together, we argue that the spontaneous
(study of Abe et al.) or triggered (our paradigm) reminder of
a promise one is not allowed (study of Abe et al.) or willing (our
paradigm) to keep evokes an emotional response in deceptive
or dishonest subject, which might include a guilty conscience
toward the interaction partner and/or a fearful reaction that the
deceptive or dishonest act will be detected.
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tum during the breaking of a promise in the decision stage of our
paradigm. Similar to the observed activity of the amygdala, only
very few of the discussed deception studies reported activations
in the striatum (e.g., Nun˜ez et al., 2005); these activations are
commonly observed during tasks that require individuals to
suppress a prepotent or frequent response (Aron et al., 2007;
Casey et al., 2002). Thus, the activity in the striatum may reflect,
similar to the activation in the left DLPFC, the inhibition of the
impulse to answer truthfully or honestly. However, we suggest
an alternative interpretation for the striatum activation in our
paradigm for the following reasons. First, in contrast to the
DLPFC activation, which was restricted to phase A of the
decision stage, we observed sustained activation in the ventral
striatum during the entire time window of the decision stage,
suggesting a different cognitive or affective process. Second,
in contrast to the few deception studies which reported
activation in this brain region, our study used a social exchange
paradigm in which subjects deliberately decided to break the
promise with the goal of increasing their monetary payoff at the
expense of the exchange partner. Due to the well-known role
of the striatum in social (e.g., Fliessbach et al., 2007; Rilling
et al., 2004) and nonsocial (Delgado et al., 2004; Liu et al.,
2007) reward processing and its strong impact on decision
making (de Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2005, 2008;
for a recent review, Fehr and Camerer, 2007; King-Casas
et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 2007), we thus speculate that the
activation in the striatum might represent the motivational, appe-
titive component of the dishonest act. In other words, subjects
might be motivated to break the promise because the activation
in the ventral striatum reinforces the dishonest act and thus
might act as a counterbalance against the aversive emotions
(e.g., guilty conscience) and potential negative consequences
in case the deception should be detected. We suggest designing
future studies that allow examining whether the former, the latter,
or both interpretations for the striatum activity apply.
Summing up, this study explored the neural correlate of
nonbinding cooperative agreements in the form of a promise—
one of the oldest human-specific psychological mechanisms
fostering trust, cooperation, and partnership formation. In order
to study this psychological mechanism, we applied a social
interaction paradigm derived from game theory in which
subjects were completely free to decide whether to keep or
break the promise and in which the dishonest act included
both benefits for the subjects and costs for the exchange part-
ners. Findings revealed that each of the three processes playing
an important role during nonbinding cooperative agreements is
associated with a unique brain activation pattern, allowing us
to discriminate dishonest from honest subjects. In detail, we
found (1) that the implementation of the dishonest act is associ-
ated with increased activity in brain regions known to be involved
in cognitive control and conflict processing, including the DLPFC
and ACC. In addition, we also demonstrated (2) increased
activation during this stage of the paradigm in emotion-related
brain regions, including amygdala and ventral striatum.
We suggest that the amygdala activation may represent the
guilty conscience or the fear that the deceptive act could be
detected, whereas the activity in the ventral striatum mightrepresent the motivating and driving force behind the deceptive
act. Finally, one of the most important findings concerns (3) the
predictive power of ‘‘perfidious’’ brain activation patterns in
the ACC, bilateral frontoinsular cortex, and right IFG during the
promise or the anticipation stages for the final decision whether
to keep or break the promise. Even though during the promise
stage the behavior of those subjects who ultimately cheat their
exchange partner and those who finally keep their promise
does not differ—both types of subject promise to keep the
informal agreement—the brain activations of the ‘‘cheaters’’
and the ‘‘promise keepers’’ show very distinct patterns during
the promise stage. These findings contribute to a recent debate
about whether data from neuroscience are relevant for sciences
such as economics that are primarily interested in understanding
and predicting behavior (Camerer et al., 2005; Glimcher and
Rustichini, 2004). The fact that the cheaters’ brain activations
during the promise and anticipation stages differ unambiguously
from those of the promise keepers, even though both of them
perform the same behavior, means that the brain activations
alone and not just the observed behaviors are capable of
predicting the dishonest act. Thus, our study shows that data
from neuroscience can provide important insights into behavior
that extend beyond that which purely behavioral data can detect.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
A total of 34 healthy male students from different universities in Zurich
participated in the study. Eight of the participants had to be excluded from
the analyses; one subject due to scanner malfunctions and another seven
subjects due to design constraints (see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures for details), resulting in 26 male subjects (mean age ± SD, 23.5 ± 2.5)
for the analyses of the behavioral and brain imaging data. All subjects were
free of chronic diseases, mental disorders, medication, and drug or alcohol
abuse. The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki principles and approved by the institutional ethics committee. All
subjects gave written, informed consent and were informed of their right to
discontinue participation at any time. Subjects received a lump sum payment
of CHF 40 for participating in the experiment plus the additional money earned
during the trust game trials (exchange rate 10 money units = 2.5 Swiss Franc,
that is about $2.50).
Design
In total, subjects played 24 trust game trials in the role of a trustee (player B)
against 24 different and anonymous human interaction partners in the role of
an investor (player A, see Figures 1 and 2 and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for details). In half of these trials, subjects had to make a promise
for three subsequently played trust game trials whether they always, mostly,
sometimes, or never plan to send back half of the money so that both players
earn the same amount. Importantly, player A was always informed about B’s
promise, and B could keep the promise, but he was also allowed to break it.
In total, player B made four promise decisions and each of these decisions
held for the three subsequent trust game trials. There were also four instances
during which player B was informed that he could not decide on a promise
level; the three succeeding trust game trials were thus played without promise.
Trust game trials with and without antecedent promise stage were presented
counterbalanced and pseudorandomized.
Behavioral Analysis
We created two return rate indexes for the behavioral data (return decisions)—
one for trust game trials with antecedent promise stage and one for trials
without antecedent promise stage. The index measures player B’s average
return rate for the trust game trials in which player A trusted, i.e., theNeuron 64, 756–770, December 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 767
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Using these two behavioral indexes, we performed a hierarchical cluster
analysis based on the Ward method (using the squared Euclidean distance
measure) in order to classify our subjects into different subgroups. This cluster
analysis revealed a cluster solution with two strongly separated clusters (see
dendrogram of Figure S1). Inspection of the two clusters revealed two groups
of subjects, i.e., those who either behaved trustworthily (referred to in the
paper as honest group/subjects) or those who acted untrustworthily (referred
to in the paper as dishonest group/subjects). Please see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures section for further information on the analyses of
the behavioral data, including promise levels, response times and trust rates
of player A.
fMRI Acquisition
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole-body MR
Scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with
an eight-channel Philips SENSE head coil. Structural image acquisition con-
sisted of 180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75 mm slice thickness). For
functional imaging, a total of 380 volumes were obtained using a SENSitivity
Encoded (SENSE; Pruessmann et al., 1999) T2*-weighted echo-planar
imaging sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. Forty-two axial slices
were acquired covering the whole brain with a slice thickness of 3 mm; no in-
terslice gap; interleaved acquisition; TR = 3000 ms; TE = 35 ms; flip angle =
77, field of view = 220 mm; matrix size = 803 80. We used a tilted acquisition
in an oblique orientation at 30 to the AC-PC line in order to optimize functional
sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes.
fMRI Analysis
Data were preprocessed and statistically analyzed using SPM5. For
preprocessing, all images were realigned to the first volume, corrected for
motion artifacts and time of acquisition within a TR, normalized into standard
stereotaxic space (template provided by the Montreal Neurological Institute),
and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
For statistical analysis, we performed random-effects analyses on the
functional data for the promise, anticipation, and decision stage. For that
purpose, we estimated two general linear models (GLMs) and computed linear
contrasts of regression coefficients at the individual subject level. In order to
enable inference at the group level, we calculated second-level group
contrasts using independent t tests with factor group (dishonest/honest
group), separately for each stage of the paradigm. We applied an uncorrected
p value of 0.005 combined with a cluster-size threshold of 10 voxels to our
apriori regions of interests (see Introduction). Furthermore, we checked
whether our a priori regions of interests survive small volume family-wise-error
(FWE) corrections at p < 0.05. Crucially, all our regions of interests survived this
correction procedure. Please see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
additional information on all conducted statistical analyses, including a more
detailed description of the applied GLMs and multiple comparison corrections.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures, four
tables of brain activity, three tables of questionnaire measures, one figure of
the cluster analysis (Dendrogram) and three analyses of brain activity and
can be found with this article online at http://www.cell.com/neuron/
supplemental/S0896-6273(09)00900-3.
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